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C00002 00002	1. with Taylor p.4 on whether philosophy can actually solve problems.
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1. with Taylor p.4 on whether philosophy can actually solve problems.
on p.7 he says "Metaphysics in fact promises no ⊗knowledge of anything".

On p. 12 he ignores the possibility that person/body = program/computer.
The difficulties enunciated for materialism on pp. 14 and 15 seems totally
illusory.  One simply has to swallow all the things he finds difficult.
I don't see that 2nd order definitio could help him here unless his
difficulties are different from what he says they are.
I don't see that he has given Platonic dualism any trouble either.


All the theories of mind aylor mentions seem logically
possible though they differ in plausibility.

p.30 He finds difficulties too easily - the automaton model can
accomodate all of them.

p33 The difficulty he finds with identifying beliefs with states
of they body applies to beliefs written on a piece of paper.

5. The refutation of soft determinism on pp. 48-49
is "refuted" by showing that the soft determinist
notion of "can" is useful for machines both from
the external and the internal points of view.
The inner states he refers to aren't under conscious control.